Georgia Congressmen and the First Hundred Days of the New Deal

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WHEN Franklin D. Roosevelt became President of the United States on March 4, 1933,[1] the country was suffering through its severest economic depression. In answering the popular demand for legislation that would ease the terrible suffering, the new President summoned Congress into special session on March 9. The hundred days that followed constituted one of the most remarkable periods of legislative action in the nation's history.

Nine Georgia Congressmen—all Democrats—answered the President's call when the House of Representatives convened on March 9.[2] The senior member of the delegation was Carl Vinson of the sixth district, who had served in Congress since 1914. Perhaps the most active and influential member of the group was Eugene Cox of the second district, a veteran of nine years' service in the House. Other experienced Georgians included Homer C. Parker of the first district, Malcolm C. Tarver of the seventh, and John S. Wood of the ninth. Braswell D. Deen, Bryant T. Castellow and Emmett M. Owens of the eighth, third, and fourth districts, respectively, were the freshmen members of the delegation. With the exception of Robert Ramspeck of Atlanta, all of the Georgia Congressmen represented farm constituencies and had rural interests foremost in mind when the unprecedented session began.

In answering the nation's needs President Roosevelt and Congress gave top priority to the crisis in banking. On March 4 the President declared a bank holiday and embargoed the export of gold, resting his authority to do both on the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. At the same time Roosevelt instructed the Secretary of the Treasury to draft an emergency banking bill to present to Congress when the special session began. Freshman Congressman Deen, who had engaged in the banking business

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before his election to Congress, was among those invited to the White House for consultation on the move. Deen endorsed the President's actions.[3]

Shortly after noon on March 9, while many Congressmen were looking for places to sit, Representative Henry Steagall of Alabama, Chairman of the House Banking Committee, read aloud the only available copy of the banking proposal. After only thirty-eight minutes of debate, the House shouted its unanimous approval of the measure. Georgians were among those who shouted the loudest.[4] After Senate approval later in the day, the President signed the Banking Bill that evening. Rather than nationalization of the banks, as some wanted, the bill extended government assistance to private bankers, gave the President control over gold movements, and authorized the Treasury to issue new Federal Reserve notes. While the Congressional approval did not indicate any precise method of curing the nation's economic ills, it did reveal the strong commitment to action which prevailed in Congress.

The President and Congress next turned to government and economy. Advised to attack the excessive spending of the Hoover Administration, Roosevelt had promised in the Presidential campaign to reduce government expenditures by twenty-five per cent. On March 10 he asked Congress to fulfill this promise. His plan included a $400 million reduction in compensation payments to veterans of World War I as well as salary cuts of government employees, including Congressmen. The President would be granted broad discretion in administering these cuts.

Rather than sympathy which greeted his banking message, the President's new proposal drew immediate opposition from Congressmen of both parties. Some blamed the President's request on the influence of Wall Street at the White House, while others demanded more spending, not less. Representative Tarver insisted that passage of the bill would be "an abdication by Congress of its Constitutional right" because it gave too much power to the President. Tarver suggested that his colleagues cut the salaries themselves instead of placing the burden on the President.[5]

Georgia Congressmen faced tremendous pressure from both sides of the issue. Fear of Presidential reprisal and loss of patronage perhaps convinced some Congressmen of the wisdom of the measure. On the other hand, veterans' groups in the state vigorously spoke out against the bill.[6] However, only Tarver voted with the veterans when the House passed the legislation on March 11.[7] The Economy Act became the Administration's second weapon to use against the depression.

On March 13 the President asked Congress to amend the Volstead Act by legalizing the sale of beer. He requested that substantial taxes be levied on beer and insisted that the bill was strictly a revenue measure. If the President was trying to unify his party in Congress, as some historians have suggested, his proposal produced the opposite reaction in the South, including Georgia Congressmen.[8]

When the House passed the Beer Bill the day following the Administration's request, only two Georgians voted with the President. Others, still frightened by the specter of alcoholism, attacked the measure for a variety of reasons. Representative Tarver, among the staunchest dry advocates, believed that the bill would aid law violators, rather than stop them as the proponents of the measure claimed. Tarver insisted that violators would become "respectable," warning that beer dealers would move into many areas and control politics there.[9]

Congressman Deen, another opponent of the bill, was unable to understand how a "poverty-stricken nation [could] drink itself to prosperity, or how we [could] forget that millions [were] crying for bread instead of beer."[10] Deen complained that the bill was premature, that the voters should have been allowed to express themselves on the Eighteenth Amendment before Congress modified the Volstead Act. Like other Southern Congressmen, Deen had pledged to his constituents that he would await their action on the Eighteenth Amendment before casting any vote to repeal or modify the Volstead Act.[11]

Prohibitionist Representatives were determined to keep dry the Capitol and Congressmen, if not the rest of the country. In

special beer legislation enacted to raise revenue for the District of Columbia, Representative Tarver offered an amendment prohibiting the sale of beer in the Capitol and other federal buildings. Tarver feared that the Capitol would become a "saloon," and when Congressman Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois resented the use of this term, Tarver insisted that any place where beer was sold was a saloon. Although the Georgian was supported by a number of Southerners, the House soundly rejected his amendment.[12]

Thus far the Administration's first three requests—banking, economy, and beer legislation—had done little to alarm conservatives, impress liberals, or improve the economic situation. Then, on March 16, the direction of the New Deal took a dramatically new course. On that day, the President asked Congress to approve a broad national program to relieve the agriculture distress. The primary feature of the President's proposal was the domestic allotment plan, which offered the farmer a federal subsidy in return for his agreement to limit output. This subsidy would be financed by a processing tax to be levied on flour, textile mills, and packing houses. A number of other features of the proposal gave the Secretary of Agriculture unprecedented power over the nation's farmers.[13]

The House of Representatives considered the Agricultural Adjustment Act on March 21 under a special rule prohibiting any amendments to the measure. On this and other occasions during the session, the Rules Committee, subject to the whole House, laid down strict rules limiting debate and restricting the number of amendments that could be offered.

Against Republican charges of "gag rule," Representative Cox vigorously defended the rule on the farm measure.[14] A member of the Rules Committee, Cox confessed that such procedure was "bad practice," but that in the midst of an "economic war," the nation demanded immediate action. Cox insisted that this was the Administration's bill, and Congress had been ordered by the people to support the President to the limit. As for himself, Cox confessed, "I am a good soldier and will vote for this rule and

the bill, and trust that all others, because of the circumstances, will do likewise."[15]

Eastern Congressmen viewed the farm measure as "bolshevistic," and insisted that the bill favored the South at the expense of New England. They attacked the subsidies to be granted to Southern farmers which would come from the processing tax on the millers of their districts. Contrary to Cox, who claimed that when the farmer was prosperous "other industries prosper and the people buy and sell and are happy."[16] Congressman Joseph W. Martin of Massachusetts thought the measure would destroy industry. "Agriculture is not going to climb back to prosperity over the prostrate body of industry,"[17] he exclaimed.

A majority vote of 315-98 ended the debate, and produced the fourth display of the Administration's power in the House. Only four Southern Congressmen opposed the bill; the entire Georgia delegation supported the President. Their genuine solicitude for the depressed agricultural situation led the Georgians to quash their personal concern over the tremendous power granted to the Administration under the act.[18]

Besides its agricultural provisions, the farm bill as finally enacted by Congress included inflationary clauses authorizing the President to issue new greenbacks, to remonitize silver, and to alter the gold content of the dollar. It also provided for the refinancing of farm mortgages. Congressman Castellow, reflecting the strong inflationist sentiment in the House, called for some method of inflation to help the less fortunate pay their debts. The mortgage and inflation proposals received unanimous support from Castellow and his Georgia colleagues.[19]

Georgia Congressmen endorsed other measures in the President's program. They supported the Congressional resolution abrogating the gold clause,[20] the Glass-Steagall Banking Act which created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,[21] the Home Owners' Loan Act which helped home owners to refinance homes by easy long-term repayments,[22] and the Tennessee Valley Authority Act which called for extensive aid and regional planning in the Tennessee Valley.[23] Except for Congressmen Cox and Parker, the

Georgia delegation also supported the Federal Emergency Relief Act which authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to make available $500 million for unemployment relief.[24]

Legislation creating the Civilian Conservation Corps was directed through the House by Congressman Ramspeck of Atlanta. As a ranking member of the House Labor Committee, Ramspeck managed the bill after the committee chairman had refused to support it.[25]

This measure proposed to put to work in our national forests the "wild boys of the road" who were unemployed because of the depression. Under the program, the government would furnish quarters, subsistence, and medical care, and the wages to be paid would be left to the discretion of the President.[26]

Congressman Ramspeck allotted time to each side in the House discussion, answered questions concerning the bill, and closed the debate for the Administration. He was pressed especially by labor spokesmen who protested the expected dollar-a-day wage for the forest workers on the grounds the government was establishing a wage ceiling. They insisted that paying these workers thirty dollars a month violated union labor's pay scale. Ramspeck pointed out that the bill was purely a relief measure designed to help economic conditions; it had nothing at all to do with a wage scale. Amid Republican cries of "Hitlerism," the House passed the bill without a recorded vote on March 29.[27]

Two days later, with Ramspeck at his side, President Roosevelt signed the reforestation bill. It was one of the most popular measures of the session, especially to Southern Congressmen. Georgia benefited materially from the act, as a number of CCC camps were located in the state.[28]

One of the most controversial acts of the Hundred Days was the National Industrial Recovery Act, which the President called the most important legislation ever passed in the history of the American Congress. Half of the Georgia delegation opposed it in its final form. Most historians maintain that the thirty-hour work week measure of Senator Hugo Black of Alabama was the starting point of the recovery measure.

In an attempt to remedy the economic distress, Senator Black introduced legislation in December, 1932, prohibiting in interstate commerce all goods produced by labor working more than thirty hours per week. Black believed that his bill would create additional jobs by spreading the amount of available work. In early April the Senate passed Black's proposal.[29] While the House hearings on the Black bill were in progress, Georgia manufacturers besieged Congressman Ramspeck with complaints against the measure. They insisted that because economic conditions prevailed in some sections that were not general throughout the country, any move to force industry to accept a thirty-hour week would be disastrous to Southern mill and textile interests. Ramspeck agreed with their position, and worked to amend the act to give the federal administrator of the program discretionary power to apply the law to individual cases as circumstances warranted. Against any hard and fast rules, and apparently little concerned about unemployment, Ramspeck demanded protection for the mills in Georgia: "Many of them are running on a fair schedule, some of them on a full basis. Their labor supply is limited and any addition would have to be brought in from the outside necessitating provisions for housing and the like. If forced to go on a 30-hour week . . . they would have to bring in new labor, provide housing facilities for them, and . . . adjust wages all around to take care of the additional employees."[30]

Like many Southern Congressmen, the President never endorsed the Black bill. He opposed the measure because of its inflexibility and apparent unconstitutionality, although this last consideration did not discourage his enthusiasm over other measures. By the middle of May the Administration had its own plan for industrial recovery. The measure it proposed was divided into two parts. The first part provided for codes of fair business competition, and offered business exemption from the anti-trust laws. Section 7A guaranteed labor the right to a collective bargaining. The second part of the measure would create the Public Works Administration with a $3.3 billion appropriation for public works projects.

Of the thirteen Southern Representatives who voted against the

NIRA when the House endorsed the measure on May 26, none worked harder to defeat it than Georgia's durable Congressman Cox. House leaders had planned to have the measure reported from the Rules Committee on May 23, but were stopped when Cox joined four Republicans on the committee to hold the bill there. The five were able to delay action until the following day when enough Democrats attended the committee's session to report the bill. In its report, the Rules Committee asked for six hours of general debate and no amendments except those offered by the Ways and Means Committee.[31]

Congressman Cox, instrumental in getting six hours of debate rather than four as House leaders planned, led by the strong Georgia assault on the bill. He attacked what he considered its unconstitutional features, such as the price-fixing provisions, and the limitations on the hours of labor. Cox cited numerous cases in which the Supreme Court had denied such broad powers over commerce, and correctly predicted that the Court eventually would void the measure. The legislation would result in the eventual destruction of the federal system as well as the end of state sovereignty, Cox insisted. He found the "crisis" atmosphere that led him to be a "good soldier" in support of other Administration proposals—especially those which aided agriculture—to be absent in this instance.[32]

Revealing his concern for the welfare of the farmer, Cox attacked the NIRA because it would mean higher prices for those products the farmer purchased, and lower prices for what he produced:

> Take the cotton spinners. . . . They have no monopoly and can have none. They have no effective tariff subsidy. When their business is taken over by the Government, who sets up for them a wage scale, regulates hours of labor, stops operations to hold down production, in the interest of price, operating costs are bound to rise, which must be made up in some way, and since they cannot be passed on to the buying public due to the lack of consumer demand, they can only be reflected back to the farmer in a lower price for his already underpriced commodity. . . . It means his eternal ruination.[33]

Joining a familiar Republican chorus, Cox declared that "noth-

ing that Russia has done is worse than what is here proposed." In his defense of the small-scale agrarian way of life, Cox repeatedly asked for the protection of the farmer from an encroaching government:

> The farmer who produces all these commodities for interstate shipment is made subject to the law under Section 4 of this bill. He is not permitted to work his labor more than 30 hours per week, and the wage that he shall pay is to be fixed not by him but by the government. He will be made to keep books and submit to examination, and if he fails to obey the orders that descend upon him from Washington he will be thrown in jail and made to do penal servitude.[34]

Thus, Cox saw the meddlesome government of the National Industrial Recovery Act as different from the beneficient government of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. He believed that the nation had come to a "solemn and serious hour," and that if Congress passed the recovery legislation, it would mean a turning point in the political life of the country: "Indeed, we are about to do that which may mark the end of representative government in America."[35]

Representative Tarver opposed the measure because he believed that it gave too much power to the President. He had opposed New Deal measures before on similar grounds. The granting of so much power was not bad as long as a Democrat remained in the White House, Tarver suggested, but "sometime in the future we might have another Republican administration"[36] which would use the legislation to further the cause of business interests. Tarver also feared that the New England textile industry would use the act to enhance its interests at the expense of the South: "I tremble to think what the cotton manufacturers of New England, who have long been jealous of the gradual transfer of that industry to the South, might do to Southern textile manufacturers under a Republican administration if a precedent like this is established and upheld by the courts."[37]

Some Congressmen questioned the consistency of the Georgians, all of whom had supported the farm measures in the same "crisis" atmosphere. Easterners insisted that the New Deal farm bills in-

fringed on state prerogatives as much as did the business recovery legislation. One New Yorker pointed out that since this was a time when states were unable to cope with the terrible economic conditions, federal aid was warranted. He suggested the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, and the Home Owner's Loan Bill as examples of the generous aid given in the interest of the farmer. When questioned by Cox concerning the "justification" of the recovery measure, Congressman James Lanzetta of New York replied that since Congress had "been asked to step in and help the farmers and home owners, the people who are out of employment have a right to come to Congress and ask Congress to help them."[38]

As a staunch defender of constitutionalism and local interests, Representative Cox's allegiance to the New Deal often was strained over legislation that he considered unconstitutional. In 1933 his opposition to the Truth-in-Securities Bill and the Railroad Coordination Act illustrated this concern.

In late March the Administration asked for legislation which would insure full publicity for all securities involved in interstate commerce. The bill would authorize the Federal Trade Commission to supervise future securities issues, require each issue to be accompanied by pertinent financial information, and would make company officials civilly and criminally liable on stock misrepresentations. Sam Rayburn, Chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, led the bill to passage without a recorded vote in the House.[39]

Before this vote, however, Cox attacked the measure as unconstitutional. He questioned the government's power to regulate trade "back to the point of the preparation of production of the article which is intended to be put in commerce," and pointed out that the Supreme Court had always held that no article was a part of commerce until it had entered the channel of commerce. In answer to Rayburn's contention that if a man did not intend to sell securities in interstate commerce he was not forced to register them, Cox maintained that in the securities bill Congress was attempting "to bar from Commerce a mere prospectus which

simply extolls the merit of some article or thing." Since the prospectus was not commerce, it was not subject to federal control, the Georgian insisted. In opposing the bill, Cox agreed with House Republicans who argued that Congress was pre-empting power that had been exclusively that of the states for 140 years.[40]

Cox also opposed another Rayburn-sponsored proposal, the Railroad Coordination Act, which created a Federal Coordinator of Transportation who was charged with bringing together the various transportation agencies in order to guarantee adequate service. Like most other areas of the economy, railroads had suffered severely from the depression; by 1933 many of the roads were in danger of falling into receiverships.

On June 5 the railroad measure passed the House without a recorded vote. In the House debate, Congressmen offered one amendment after another designed to please local interests. Congressman Cox spoke for Georgia's rural interests by offering two amendments in behalf of the so-called "short-line" railroads. The Rayburn bill planned to coordinate these roads with the larger lines. One of Cox's amendments provided that "no routes now existing should be eliminated except with the consent of all participating lines or upon order of the coordinator." Cox told the House that these short roads enjoyed certain benefits arranged for between the short-line people themselves, and if such existing arrangements were interrupted it would put the short roads out of business. Worse, it would mean the destruction of many small industries which had been built along the short-line roads, and were served by them. The Congressman insisted that these community interests, employing local people, were as important to the nation as the larger units. Due primarily to Rayburn's opposition, the Cox amendment was defeated.[41]

With the setback, Cox took another route. He proposed that the Rayburn bill not apply to independently owned and operated steam or electric railroads which in 1932 had operating revenues of less than $1,000,000. In this instance, Cox's agricultural sympathies motivated him. In defending his motion, Cox pointed out that many short-line roads served strictly agricultural communities,

with a highly seasonal business. The roads hauled cotton, grain, vegetables, and fruits during the busy season. Certain aspects of the bill, Cox insisted, would make operating costs so heavy that these small roads would die. In a plea for help from agricultural interests, Cox declared that every Representative from an agricultural district should see the obvious need and join the fight. Too few followed, and his amendment was defeated.[42]

Congressman Ramspeck of Atlanta also expressed dissatisfaction with the railroad bill. At the suggestion of the Atlanta Freight Bureau, which represented the shippers in Ramspeck's district, the Atlantan offered an amendment to place shippers on the proposed Coordinating Committee. Rayburn's strong objections helped defeat Ramspeck's proposal.[43]

The dean of the Georgia delegation, Carl Vinson of Milledgeville, played a somewhat different role than the rest of the group. As Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, he spent the greater portion of his energy trying to obtain adequate appropriations for the Navy.

After Roosevelt was elected, Congressman Vinson believed that he would receive strong support from the White House on naval legislation. The President had a deep personal interest in the Navy, had served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy during World War I, and at one time had suggested the building of a fleet to surpass even that of the British. During the campaign of 1932 Roosevelt seemed to favor an increase in naval appropriations while other party members hinted at reductions in military expenditures.[44]

But the advent of the New Deal did not bring immediate blessings to the Navy. Considerations of economy precluded any lavish appropriations. In fact, in 1933 Budget Director Lewis Douglas recommended a large reduction in military appropriations for the new fiscal year.[45]

Busily engaged in his massive recovery program, the President was little concerned over naval and other military matters. Alarmed over the attitude of Douglas and the apparent disinterest of the President, Vinson asked the powerful Navy League to in-

fluence public sentiment against measures to reduce the size of the fleet. The league sent statements to 3,000 newspaper editors urging naval construction as a weapon of recovery in providing employment and security.[46]

Results were forthcoming. Section 202 of the National Industrial Recovery Act authorized the President to allocate $283 million of PWA funds for the construction of thirty-two vessels. Vinson defended this action as a sound relief measure. Besides the obvious stimulus to heavy industry, eighty-five per cent of this money went for wages, and benefited almost every state in the Union. The South gained especially from the allocation. This provision in the NIRA was due, in part at least, to the influence of Vinson and his almost complete agreement with the entire New Deal program.[47]

Vinson did not demand large naval appropriations during the Hundred Days. A number of measures he introduced in the House called for economy, and were proposed in the interests of efficiency rather than expansion. Although the Congressman was known as a "big navy" man, he did not believe that the situation warranted heavy increases. Perhaps Vinson's role during the session was much like the President's generally in that he attempted to chart a course between two extremes, those who advocated drastic cuts in naval expenditures, and those devotees who wanted to spend too much for naval expansion. Vinson was willing to wait for the real naval buildup; in the meantime, he was content to be the most ardent New Dealer in the Georgia delegation.

Other than participating in the larger view of the Hundred Days, Georgia Congressmen were engaged with proposals of their own. These reflected both the national concern for economic and political recuperation as well as the individual Congressman's constant preoccupation with home and state interests.

For example, Congressman Cox—for all his fear of government bureaucracy—insisted that Georgians participate in the job opportunities that the federal government offered. Thus, he proposed a Congressional investigation to ascertain if each state had its quota of civil servants employed in the several departments, com-

missions, or independent offices in Washington, as required by the Civil Service Act of 1883. The quota for each state was based on the state's population. Cox told the House that Georgia was entitled to 786 employees under the quota system, but had only 382. He revealed that New York was being cheated on a grand scale, while Virginia and other states had many more jobs than the law warranted. Too engrossed in other matters, the House did not act on Cox's proposal.[48]

Representative Deen, among the most active of the freshman Congressmen, offered a number of proposals to aid business recovery and to economize in government. In the interest of the latter, he wanted to reduce Congressional salaries, and also proposed to reduce the mileage allotment given to each Congressman. While these specific resolutions were not acted upon, their objectives were included in the Economy Act and other legislation passed during the session.

To hasten economic recovery, Deen offered measures which would take the government out of business. For example, he sponsored a bill to place both rural and city mail delivery on a private contract basis. Deen estimated that this proposal would save the government from $75 to $100 million, while at the same time promoting business recovery. The Georgian believed that since private business was supporting the government, the latter hurt itself by infringing on business opportunities. But he failed to convince his colleagues of the wisdom of his proposal.[49]

Another example of the delegation's concern for the welfare of business was Congressman Tarver's bill to restrict the manufacture of certain cotton products at the Atlanta federal penitentiary. As part of the general work schedule, convict labor at the Atlanta institution produced textile products which competed with Georgia mill interests. The Cotton Manufacturers' Association and textile mill operators had complained for years about this competition. The *Atlanta Constitution* supported the Tarver proposal, and called on Congressmen from all cotton mill states to join Tarver's effort. A special Congressional committee was formed

to study the matter; this was the extent of the action at this session.[50]

Most of the Georgia Congressmen supported measures designed to restrict further immigration into the United States. Besides immigration restriction, Representative Tarver worked to undermine the "alien influences" that he feared immigrants brought to this country. In this session, as in others, Tarver proposed a constitutional amendment to exclude aliens from the population count determining each state's representation in Congress. If enacted, many Southern states, including Georgia, would gain representation; states such as New York and Pennsylvania, with large alien populations, would lose a Congressman or two. In a radio address explaining his plan, Tarver insisted that there was no justification for allowing some 6,284,613 "citizens of foreign governments" to exercise "unwarranted power" over the federal government. Although Congress failed to act, the Georgia delegation supported Tarver's motion.[51]

Just as was the case with all state delegations in the House, Georgians sought local help in one form or another. Congressman Ramspeck wanted the federal government to construct a memorial highway from Stone Mountain to the national cemetery at Marietta. Tarver requested federal funds to set up a commission to provide for the commemoration of the Civil War engagements which were fought in his north Georgia district. Parker asked for legislation to extend the time period for starting and completing a bridge to be constructed across the Savannah River near Sylvania. The entire delegation asked for pensions for a number of individuals; they also requested the adjudication of many private claims against the federal government. Thus, the Hundred Days session was not devoted entirely to the great national movement.[52]

The action of Georgia Congressmen during the Hundred Days was in some respects similar to their performance in the fruitless lame-duck session which preceded it. The tempo of the two sessions was radically different, of course, the latter being accelerated by the Democratic victory in November, 1932, and the new organizational make-up of Congress. Further, working with

an "adopted son"[53] of their own state was much more acceptable to the Georgians than cooperating with a Republican President who had never capitalized on his historic invasion of the Solid South in 1928. But Georgians still opposed beer legislation; the two Congressmen who voted for the New Deal bill were the only two who had supported a similar beer measure in the lame-duck session. Agricultural legislation provides another case in point. The Jones Bill, passed by the House in the lame-duck session, had some of the characteristics of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. In both cases, Georgia Congressmen offered solid support only after Southern farm products were suggested for the preferred lists and after the cotton textile industry was granted safeguards in the administration of the processing tax.

Strong party loyalty and the prevailing economic conditiions accounted for much of the enthusiasm Georgia Congressmen had for the President and his program. Congressman Vinson once exclaimed: "I am going down the line with him, and if anyone wants to make it an issue I will accept the challenge."[54] Most of the Georgians, hard pressed to offer remedies of their own, supported much of the New Deal legislation on the basis of the Administration's greater ability to judge what the economy needed.

The crisis atmosphere that prevailed during the Hundred Days doubtless created a "honeymoon" between Congress and the President. Indeed, many historians have insisted that Roosevelt rode roughshod over Congress during the session.[55] If this is true, the latter was a willing victim, and public demand a determined accomplice. Georgia Congressmen had been granted a mandate as well as President Roosevelt. Their mandate was to allow the President as much freedom as possible to grapple with the depression. Thus, rather than capitulation, most Georgia Congressmen merely reacted to the national mood.

But even with the mandate, the party loyalty, and the happy patronage prospects, there were signs of Southern recalcitrance during the Hundred Days. Local interests motivated Georgia Congressmen to oppose some of the Administration's program, while constitutional concern led them to oppose other measures.

The performance of Congressman Cox suggested that not everything the President wanted would be forthcoming. Cox did not always play the "good soldier," and in the case of the National Industrial Recovery Act he used his influence to retard the progress of the Administration's proposal. On agricultural legislation he usually remained loyal, and urged the limitation of House debate of farm measures because of the complicated "technical problems" involved. Like other Southern and Georgia Congressmen, Cox often was hostile to legislation which served labor and urban interests.

In the final analysis, nevertheless, Georgia Congressmen contributed substantially to the legislative record of the Hundred Days. They accepted the need for quick action and willingly gave the President unprecedented peacetime power. For the moment, they supported almost to the limit the "adopted son"—the one man who they believed could do more than any other for the people of Georgia.

NOTES

[1]In both the presidential preferential primary in March, 1932, and in the national election the following November, the voters of Georgia overwhelmingly endorsed Roosevelt for President.

[2]According to the Georgia Reapportionment Act of 1931, the state was entitled to ten Congressmen. However, Congressman Charles Brand of the tenth district was ill at his home in Athens, and died before he could return to Washington.

[3]Interview with former Congressman Braswell D. Deen, December 30, 1964. Hereinafter cited as Deen Interview.

[4]E. E. Cox, "A Review of the Record of the 'New Deal' Congress With Brief Reference to His Own Activities," copy in Eugene Cox Papers (Mrs. Eugene Cox, Washington, D. C.). Hereinafter cited as Cox Papers. *Atlanta Constitution*, March 10, 1933.

[5]*Atlanta Constitution*, March 12, 1933.

[6]*Ibid.*, March 14, March 16, April 7, April 17, 1933; Deen Interview.

[7]*Congressional Record*, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., 217-18. V. O. Key, Jr., close student of Southern politics, has maintained that Southern Representatives were able to ignore Legion lobbyists without endangering their political careers. See Key, "The Veterans and the House of Representatives," in *Journal of Politics*, V, (February, 1943), 27, 35.

[8]Samuel I. Roseman, ed., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York, 1938-1950), II, 66-67. Hereinafter cited as *Public Papers*. James McGregor Burns has written of the beer proposal: "The shattered ranks of Democratic congressmen quickly solidified behind this popular move. . ." See Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (New York, 1956), 168.

[9]*Congressional Record*, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., 388-89.

[10]*Ibid.*, 403.

[11]Miscellaneous article, Braswell D. Deen Papers (Braswell Deen, Sr., Alma, Georgia). Hereinafter cited as Deen Papers.

[12]*Congressional Record*, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., 826-28.

[13]*Public Papers*, II, 67-74.

[14]Cox was among the most popular and influential members of the House. Besides his position on the Rules Committee, he served on the Steering Committee and the Committee on Committees, which outlined party policy and determined the legislative program in the House. In addition, Cox was on a special five-man House Committee which was organized to advise the President on proposed legislation.

[15]*Congressional Record*, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., 670.

[16]Miscellaneous article, Cox Papers.

[17]Joseph W. Martin, *My First Fifty Years in Politics* (New York, 1960), 75.

[18]Deen Interview; *Congressional Record*, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., 667, 669, 693, 766.

[19]*Congressional Record*, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., 1680, 2888, 3124.

[20]*Ibid.*, 4555, 4557. [21]*Ibid.*, 4059.

[22]William E. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal* (New York, 1963), 53.

[23]*Congressional Record*, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., 2384, 3600.

[24]*Ibid.*, 2130.

[25]Letter from former Congressman Robert Ramspeck to the author, November 25, 1964.

[26]*Public Papers*, II, 81.

[27]*Congressional Record*, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., 890, 897, 955-58, 876, 995.

[28]Deen Interview; *Atlanta Constitution*, April 6, 1933.

[29]Raymond Moley, *After Seven Years* (Yew York, 1939), 186.

[30]*Atlanta Constitution*, April 16, 1933.

[31]*Ibid.*, May 24, 1933; *Congressional Record*, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., 4188-98.

[32]*Congressional Record*, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., 3044-51, 4206, 4325-28.

[33]*Ibid.*, 3051. [34]*Ibid.* [35]*Ibid.*, 4325.

[36]*Ibid.*, 4225-27. [37]*Ibid.* [38]*Ibid.*, 3048.

[39]*Atlanta Constitution*, May 6, 1933.

[40]*Congressional Record*, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., 2911, 2919-20, 2938-39.

[41]*Ibid.*, 4945-46. [42]*Ibid.*, 4950-51. [43]*Ibid.*, 4941-42.

[44]George T. Davis, *A Navy Second to None* (New York, 1940), 357; Ray V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, *The 1932 Campaign: An Analysis* (New York, 1935), 136-37.

[45]Armin Rappaport, *The Navy League of The United States* (Detroit, Michigan, 1962), 157.

[46]*Ibid.*, 158.

[47]Davis, *Navy Second to None*, 359; *Atlanta Constitution*, June 4, 1933.

[48]*Congressional Record*, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., 4785-86.

[49]*Ibid.*, 240, 1240, 1007; Deen Interview.

[50]*Atlanta Constitution*, May 3, May 4, May 8, June 10, 1933.

[51]*Congressional Record*, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., 154, 2103-2104; Deen Interview.

[52]*Congressional Record*, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., 152, 1938; *Atlanta Constitution*, June 17, 1933.

[53]Since he had first come to Warm Springs to recuperate from polio, Roosevelt often called Georgia his "adopted state."

[54]*Atlanta Constitution*, March 24, 1933.

[55]Eric Goldman has described the session as "the most controlled, directed, overpowered period in all the history of Congress." See Goldman, *Rendezvous With Destiny* (New York, 1952), 255.